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OPINION 
                     
COWEN, Circuit Judge.                     
  
 
 In this case we must decide whether appellant Marjorie Jo 
Faish is entitled to have her student-loan obligation discharged 
in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.  If Faish can establish 
that repayment of her student-loan debt would result in "undue 
hardship" under § 523(a)(8)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, she is 
entitled to have her entire debt discharged.  11 U.S.C. § 
523(a)(8)(B). 
 The Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, citing equitable considerations, held that Faish 
need repay only $15,000.00, less than half of her loan 
obligation.  On appeal, the District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, applying a modified version of the 
"undue hardship" test set forth in In re Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. 
Dec. 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979), reversed the bankruptcy court.  
The district court held that because Faish had failed to 
establish that the repayment of her entire student-loan 
obligation would impose "undue hardship," no discharge was 
appropriate here. 
 We must also decide what legal standard bankruptcy courts 
within the Third Circuit will now apply when they consider 
whether the facts presented give rise to "undue hardship," as 
that term is to be construed under § 523(a)(8)(B).  This area of 
the law is presently in a state of considerable confusion, with 
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bankruptcy courts within our Circuit applying a broad range of 
standards.1 
                                                           
1
  The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania's recitation of the following bankruptcy court 
decisions that have developed separate tests "to determine 
whether the facts of a case constitute undue hardship" is 
indicative of the current uncertainty.  See In re Correll, 105 
B.R. 302, 305 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (citing Brunner v. New York 
State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam);  In re Conner, 89 B.R. 744 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988);  In 
re Bryant, 72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987);  In re Craig, 64 
B.R. 854 (W.D. Pa. 1986);  In re Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979)). 
 
 
For the reasons 
stated herein, we adopt the standard for "undue hardship" set 
forth by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Brunner 
v. New York State Higher 
Education Services Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam).  Pursuant to this standard, although different from the 
one applied by the district court below, we will affirm the 
district court's order that Faish's student-loan debt must be 
deemed nondischargeable in its entirety.   
I. 
 Marjorie Jo Faish obtained a Master's Degree in Public 
Health and Community Health Services Administration from the 
University of Pittsburgh in 1989.  To help defer the costs of her 
education, Faish obtained $31,879.31 in guaranteed student loans 
from the Pennsylvania Higher Education Assistance Agency 
("PHEAA").  
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Under the terms of the loan agreements, Faish was required to 
commence payments on her student-loan obligation on October 1, 
1991.   
 On 
September 27, 1993, Faish filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition 
with the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania.  On the same day, Faish filed a complaint to 
determine the dischargeability of her student loan debt to PHEAA. 
A trial on the issue of dischargeability was conducted on 
December 22, 1993.   
 On July 12, 1994, the bankruptcy court rendered its 
decision, making the following factual findings.  See  In re 
Faish, No. 93-01686, slip op. at 2-3 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. July 12, 
1994).  Faish has a job working for the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania in the Department of Public Welfare, Bureau of 
Financial Operations, as a budget analyst.  She earns a yearly 
gross salary of approximately $27,000.00.  Faish does not own an 
automobile and commutes to and from work by bus.  She has been 
unsuccessful in her pursuit of a higher-paying job. 
 Faish is thirty-years-old, unmarried and has an eleven-year-
old son.  Faish does not receive any child support payments from 
the father of her child.  She is concerned about the quality of 
the neighborhood and school district that she lives in and is now 
saving money for an automobile and a new apartment in a better 
area.   
 Faish suffers from Crohn's disease, a chronic condition 
affecting the bowel.  She also has back problems.  The bankruptcy 
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court found, however, that although Faish's health problems are 
"significant," they "are not interfering with her ability to 
work." Id. at 5. 
 Faish's original principal debt to PHEAA amounted to 
$31,879.31.  From November 13, 1991, through June 2, 1993, Faish 
repaid $4,629.92 of her loan obligation.  As of September 1993, 
Faish owed PHEAA $32,989.33.  Id. at 2. 
 After setting forth these factual findings, the bankruptcy 
court observed that "[o]ur district court has adopted the test 
for undue hardship set forth in In re Johnson . . . . The Johnson 
test divides the undue hardship inquiry test into three prongs:  
a mechanical test, a good faith test, and a policy test."  Id. at 
4. Applying the first prong of the Johnson test, the bankruptcy 
court concluded that "Faish has failed to establish a lack of a 
financial ability to repay for the foreseeable future and 
therefore fails the mechanical prong of the Johnson test."  Id. 
at 5.    
 Although the Johnson court expressly held that if a student-
loan debtor fails to satisfy the mechanical test, "discharge of 
the student loan must be denied," Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 
544, the bankruptcy court below went on to apply Johnson's good 
faith and policy tests.  As to the Johnson "good faith" test, the 
bankruptcy court found that Faish had "established a sufficient 
degree of good faith."  Faish, No. 93-01686, slip op. at 6. 
However, Faish failed the "policy test" because "avoidance of the 
obligation was a significant consideration in the filing."  Id. 
6 
 Even though Faish had failed the Johnson "undue hardship" 
test, the bankruptcy court went outside the Johnson framework and 
considered what it deemed to be equitable considerations.  The 
court cited a bankruptcy court decision from another 
jurisdiction, Woyame v. Career Education & Management (In re 
Woyame), 161 B.R. 198 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993), as authority for 
the proposition that bankruptcy courts have "some latitude in the 
amount of the nondischargeability determination even where 
individual prongs of the Johnson test are not met on their face."  
Faish, No. 93-01686, slip op. at 7.   
 The bankruptcy court concluded that "[b]ased upon the 
equities involved, Faish will be given partial relief."  Id. at 
8.2  The court observed that it was "especially influenced . . . 
by Faish's need to support a young dependent, and her desire to 
accumulate some savings in order to provide a better life for 
him."  Id. at 7-8.  Accordingly, the bankruptcy court held that 
"$15,000.00 of Faish's student loan debt will be deemed to be 
nondischargeable, and the remainder of the obligation, including 
                                                           
2
  The bankruptcy court reached this conclusion despite its 
earlier findings that 
 
Faish's current employment and income are good, as are her 
future employment and income prospects.  Although a payment 
to PHEAA of nearly $300.00 impacts significantly upon 
Faish's disposable income, it does not place her or her son 
below the subsistence level.  Indeed, Faish has managed to 
incorporate a savings component into her expenses, which is 
rare in my experience among debtors applying for 
dischargeability based upon undue hardship.  Additionally, 
Faish's degree qualifies her for promotion and/or more 
favorable employment. 
 
In re Faish, No. 93-01686, slip op. at 5 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. July 
12, 1994). 
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accrued and future interest, will be deemed to be dischargeable."  
Id. at 8.        
 On February 21, 1995, the District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania issued a memorandum opinion reversing 
the bankruptcy court.  The district court expressly rejected the 
bankruptcy court's assumption that it was bound by Johnson.  
Faish, No. 94-1353, slip op. at 4 n.2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 1995).  
The district court noted, however, that while it "would not 
rigidly confine itself to Johnson's tripartite analysis," it 
would abide by Johnson's "general framework."  Id. at 4.     
 The district court observed that it was "the bankruptcy 
judge's step beyond Johnson which has given rise to PHEAA's 
appeal."  Id. at 6.  The district court then reviewed the 
propriety of the bankruptcy judge's consideration of equitable 
factors not contemplated by Johnson's three-pronged inquiry.  The 
court stated in dictum that "the bankruptcy court must be 
prepared to move beyond Johnson to the extent that the Johnson 
analysis fails to capture scenarios requiring some form of 
student debt relief to alleviate undue hardship."  Id. at 7.  
However, "the circumstances necessary to justify discharge must 
be unusual, and the hardship faced in the event of full repayment 
must be substantial."  Id. Citing Faish's favorable employment 
prospects, the court concluded that "the continued viability of 
governmentally guaranteed student loans is simply incompatible 
with discharging student debt on the instant facts."  Id. at 7-8.  
Accordingly, the district court ordered that "Faish's student 
8 
debt must be deemed nondischargeable in its entirety."  Id. at 8.  
This appeal followed.   
   II. 
   We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).  Our review 
of the district court's interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code is 
plenary.  Leeper v. Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 
49 F.3d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1995);  In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 
739 (3d Cir. 1993).  The debtor has the burden of demonstrating 
undue hardship.  Woodcock v. Chemical Bank, NYSHESC (In re 
Woodcock), 45 F.3d 363, 367 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 64 
U.S.L.W. 3241 (U.S. 1995);  In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132, 1137 
(7th Cir. 1993). 
III. 
 Section 523(a)(8)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code provides as 
follows: 
 (a)  A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), 
or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor 
from any debt-- 
 . . .  
 (8)  for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, 
insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit, or made under any 
program funded in whole or in part by a governmental unit or 
nonprofit institution, or for an obligation to repay funds 
received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend,  
unless-- 
 (A)  such loan, benefit, scholarship, or stipend overpayment 
first became due more than 7 years (exclusive of any applicable 
suspension of the repayment period) before the date of the filing 
of the petition; or 
 (B)  excepting such debt from discharge under this paragraph 
will impose an undue hardship on the debtor and the debtor's 
dependents; 
 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (emphasis added).     
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 Section 523(a)(8)(B) was passed as part of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978.  As one commentator has explained, the "undue 
hardship" exception of § 523(a)(8)(B) 
is difficult to apply because the drafters of the Bankruptcy 
Code did not define undue hardship.  The drafters said that 
bankruptcy courts must decide undue hardship on a case-by-
case basis, considering all of a debtor's circumstances.  
Looking for guidance in the undue hardship cases, the 
bankruptcy courts have shaped facts and circumstances tests 
of undue hardship by relying on the legislative history of 
section 523(a)(8). 
 
Kurt Wiese, Note, Discharging Student Loans In Bankruptcy:  The 
Bankruptcy Court Tests of "Undue Hardship," 26 Ariz. L. Rev. 445, 
447 (1984) (hereinafter Wiese, Undue Hardship).    
 Examining the Congressional Record in order to discern the 
legislative purpose behind the enactment of § 523(a)(8)(B), we 
observed in In re Pelkowski that "the debate in the main focused 
on the twin goals of rescuing the student loan program from 
fiscal doom and preventing abuse of the bankruptcy process by 
undeserving debtors."  Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 743.  Thus, the 
Pelkowski court expressed agreement with the conclusion of the 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit that "Congress enacted 11 
U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) in an effort to prevent abuses in and protect 
the solvency of educational loan programs."  Id.  (quoting In re 
Merchant, 958 F.2d 738, 742 (6th Cir. 1992)). 
 The Pelkowski court held that "[t]he Congressional intent to 
eliminate debtor abuse of the educational loan program would 
apply both to single makers of loan notes and to co-makers, 
whether students or their parents or other co-signers, as all may 
abuse the bankruptcy system or take advantage of legal 
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loopholes." Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 744.  The court concluded that 
"Congress has revealed an intent to limit the dischargeability of 
educational loan debt, and we can construe the provision no more 
narrowly than the language and the legislative history allow."  
Id. at 745.  See Darrell Dunham & Ronald A. Buch, Educational 
Debts Under the Bankruptcy Code, 22 Mem. St. L. Rev. 679, 702 
(1992) (hereinafter Dunham & Buch, Educational Debts) ("Congress 
clearly intended that most educational debt still due within 
seven years of graduation should be nondischargeable.").  
IV. 
A. 
 Before we address the merits of Faish's petition, we must 
decide which of the several "undue hardship" tests should be 
applied in the present matter.  As one commentator has explained, 
"[b]ankruptcy courts use a wide variety of tests to determine 
whether the debtor has demonstrated undue hardship.  While these 
tests have received varying degrees of acceptance, no particular 
test authoritatively guides or governs the undue hardship 
determination."  Thad Collins, Note, Forging a Middle Ground: 
Revision of Student Loan Debts in Bankruptcy as an Impetus to 
Amend 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), 75 Iowa L. Rev. 733, 744 (1990).  
Due to this lack of a "unified approach to undue hardship, 
litigants are in the difficult position of not knowing which 
standard will govern their case.  Consequently, effective 
presentation of evidence on undue hardship is made difficult 
unless the jurisdiction has definitively and unequivocally 
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adopted one test and a consistent set of determinative factors."  
Id. at 747.  It is to this task that we now turn. 
 The three most prominent tests applied to determine whether 
the "undue hardship" exception of § 523(a)(8)(B) should be 
invoked are the Johnson test, the Bryant test and the Brunner 
test.  The Johnson and Bryant tests have been described as "the 
two most prominent tests" bankruptcy courts have applied to 
decide whether the "undue hardship" exception should apply.  
Dunham & Buch, Educational Debts, supra, at 695.  The Brunner 
test has been adopted by a majority of the Courts of Appeals that 
have specifically addressed the issue of what single standard 
should be applied to determine whether "undue hardship" exists 
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B).  See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 395 
(setting forth the Brunner test);  In re Roberson, 999 F.2d 1132 
(7th Cir. 1993) (adopting the Brunner test);  see also Cheesman 
v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Cheesman), 25 F.3d 
356 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 731 (1995) 
(applying the Brunner test).  We will now discuss in detail the 
content and respective merits of these three "undue hardship" 
standards.      
1.  The Johnson Test 
 The tripartite Johnson test was set forth by the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in In re Johnson, 
5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 532.  The Johnson test provides as follows: 
In determining whether the undue hardship exception entitles 
a specific debtor to discharge of his student loan, a court 
should rely on three tests: 
 (1) Mechanical Test:  The court must ask:  Will the 
debtor's future financial resources for the longest 
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foreseeable period of time allowed for repayment of the 
loan, be sufficient to support the debtor and his dependents 
at a subsistence or poverty standard of living, as well as 
to fund repayment of the student loan?  If the question is 
answered affirmatively, discharge of the student loan must 
be denied. If answered negatively, then the court must apply 
the good faith test: 
 (2) Good Faith Test:  Here, the court asks two 
questions: 
 
 (a) Was the debtor negligent or irresponsible in his 
efforts to minimize expenses, maximize resources, or secure 
employment? 
 (b) If "yes," then would lack of such negligence or 
irresponsibility have altered the answer to the mechanical 
test? 
 
 If the answer to the first part of the good faith test 
is no, then the debtor should be discharged of the 
obligation to repay his student loan.  However, if the 
answers to both parts of the good faith test are "yes," then 
a presumption against discharge is established--which may be 
rebutted by a negative answer to the third and final test. 
 (3) . . .  Policy Test:  The court must ask:  Do the 
circumstances--i.e., the amount and percentage of total 
indebtedness of the student loan and the employment 
prospects of the petitioner indicate: 
 
 (a) That the dominant purpose of the bankruptcy 
petition was to discharge the student debt, or  
 (b) That the debtor has definitely benefitted 
financially from the education which the loan helped to 
finance? 
 
 If the answer to both parts of this question is a firm 
"no," then the debtor should be discharged from his student 
loan obligation.  If the court answers "yes" to either part 
of the question, then discharge should be denied. 
 
Id. at 544.   
 Johnson's tripartite analysis appears to be both 
unnecessarily complicated and unduly cumbersome.  When Johnson is 
applied correctly, however, most petitions will be denied after 
the mechanical test is applied.  Thus, in this sense, the Johnson 
test is in accord with our recognition of the Congressional 
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objectives of preventing abuse of the bankruptcy process and 
protecting the financial integrity of the student loan program.  
Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 743-44.  Similarly, both the good faith 
and policy tests provide additional protection against abuse of 
the student loan program.  The Johnson test, by its terms, 
contains no provision that would permit bankruptcy courts to 
negate a finding of nondischargeability based upon an assessment 
of other "equitable considerations" that may be deemed to be 
relevant. 
2.  The Bryant Test 
 The Bryant test was set forth by the Bankruptcy Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania eight years after Johnson 
was decided.  In re Bryant, 72 B.R. 913 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).  
The Bryant court criticized the three-part Johnson test as 
"unfortunately complicated" and promulgated an alternative test 
for "undue hardship."  Id. at 915 n.2.  The Bryant court 
explained its standard in the following terms: 
The test which we propose strives to place the element of 
objectivity into the process of decision-making in this 
area. We propose, as a starting position, to analyze the 
income and resources of the debtor and his dependents in 
relation to federal poverty guidelines established by the 
United States Bureau of the Census and determine the 
dischargeability of the student loan obligation on the basis 
of whether the debtor's income is substantially over the 
amounts set forth in those guidelines or not.  If not, a 
discharge will result only if the debtor can establish 
"unique" and "extraordinary" circumstances which should 
nevertheless render the debt dischargeable.  If the debtor's 
income is below or close to the guideline, the lender can 
prevail only by establishing that circumstances exist which 
render these guidelines unrealistic, such as the debtor's 
failure to maximize his resources or clear prospects of the 
debtor for future income increases.  We feel that such a 
test will decrease, if not eliminate the resort to the 
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unbridled subjectivity which seems to pervade many of the 
decisions in this area. 
 
Id. at 915.  Elaborating upon its new "undue hardship" exception 
standard, the bankruptcy court observed that "[w]e find ourselves 
in disagreement with those courts which have denied discharges of 
student loans on the basis of whether any given expenses are 
justified, as these represent subjective value judgments 
concerning which we consider ourselves no better able to gauge 
than, generally, debtors themselves."  Id. at 918.   
 We expressly reject and depart from this reasoning and 
analysis.  The Bryant test's refusal (or at least extreme 
reluctance) to question whether certain expenses debtors have 
incurred can be justified seems inconsistent with Congress' dual 
legislative goals of "eliminat[ing] debtor abuse of the 
educational loan program" and "preserv[ing] the fiscal integrity 
of the student loan program."  Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 744.  The 
Bryant test does not adequately account for the fact that one of 
the most common reasons student-loan debtors find themselves in 
bankruptcy court is that their "subjective value judgments" are 
often (but not always) indicative of a spendthrift philosophy 
which a bankruptcy court should be competent to consider before 
discharging their student loans.   
 The Bryant court also expressed disagreement with the first 
inquiry of the Johnson "policy test," which asks if "the dominant 
purpose of the bankruptcy petition was to discharge the student 
debt."  Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 544.  The Bryant court 
declared that since "avoiding the consequences of debts is 
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normally the reason for filing for bankruptcy . . . the fact that 
the Debtor seeks to discharge almost exclusively student loan 
obligations . . . should be irrelevant."  Bryant, 72 B.R. at 915 
n.2.  We disagree. The purpose behind the debtor's bankruptcy 
petition is not irrelevant in this context because one of the 
reasons that Congress enacted § 523(a)(8)(B) was in response to 
"reports of students discharging student loan debts after 
graduation and subsequently accepting high-paying jobs."  Wiese, 
Undue Hardship, supra, at 446. See Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396 
(Congress intended "to make the discharge of student loans more 
difficult than that of other nonexcepted debt.").  For these 
reasons, we decline to adopt the Bryant test. 
3.  The Brunner Test  
 As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has observed, 
before Brunner was decided there was "very little appellate 
authority on the definition of `undue hardship' in the context of 
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B)."  Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.  Relying 
upon the reasoning of the district court below,3 the Brunner 
court set forth the following three-part test for the "undue 
hardship" exception: 
(1)  that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current 
income and expenses, a "minimal" standard of living for 
herself and her dependents if forced to repay the loans;  
(2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this 
state of affairs is likely to persist for a significant 
portion of the repayment period for student loans;  and (3) 
that the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the 
loans. 
 
                                                           
3
  See 46 B.R. 752 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 831 F.2d at 
395. 
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Id. 
 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit formally 
adopted the Brunner test in In re Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1132.  In 
Roberson, both the bankruptcy court and the district court below 
had applied the three-part Johnson test.  After expressly 
rejecting the Johnson test and giving the Brunner test its 
imprimatur, the Seventh Circuit described how the Brunner test 
should properly be applied. 
 The Roberson court observed that "[t]he first prong of 
Brunner requires an examination of the debtor's current financial 
condition to see if payment of the loans would cause his standard 
of living to fall below that minimally necessary."  Id. at 1135.  
The court admonished that the other prongs of the Brunner test 
should not be examined if the first prong has not been satisfied.  
Id. 
 The second prong of the Brunner test requires "that 
additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of 
affairs is likely to persist for a significant portion of the 
repayment period of the student loans."  Brunner, 831 F.2d at 
396.  The Roberson court observed that this requirement "properly 
recognizes the potential continuing benefit of an education, and 
imputes to the meaning of `undue hardship' a requirement that the 
debtor show his dire financial condition is likely to exist for a 
significant portion of the repayment period."  Roberson, 999 F.2d 
at 1135.   
 The third prong of the Brunner test is the good faith 
inquiry. The Roberson court noted that the question of good faith 
17 
should only be reached if the debtor has satisfied the first two 
elements. See id. at 1136.  The good faith inquiry is to be 
guided by the understanding that "undue hardship encompasses a 
notion that the debtor may not willfully or negligently cause his 
own default, but rather his condition must result from `factors 
beyond his reasonable control.'"  Id. (quoting Comm'n on the 
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, Report, [H.R. Doc. No. 137, 
93d Congress, 1st Sess., Pt. II], at 140 n.16). 
 The Roberson court rejected the second prong of the Johnson 
"policy test," which considers "whether the debtor `has 
definitely benefitted financially from the education which the 
loan helped to finance.'"  Id. at 1136 (quoting Johnson, 5 Bankr. 
Ct. Dec. at 544).  The court observed that "[s]uch an inquiry 
conflicts with the basic concept of government-backed student 
loans."  Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1136. 
 The Seventh Circuit cited the Southern District of New 
York's statement in Brunner that federal student loan programs 
were not designed to "turn[] the government into an insurer of 
educational value."  Id. (quoting Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 756 n.3 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985)).  Students who benefit from guaranteed loan 
programs normally "would not be eligible to receive any financing 
or only financing at a higher rate of interest . . . ."  
Roberson, 999 F.2d at 1136.  Since "[t]he decision of whether or 
not to borrow for a college education lies with the individual," 
it is "the student, not the taxpayers, [that] must accept the 
consequences of the decision to borrow."  Id. at 1137. 
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 We agree with the Seventh Circuit's analysis and we offer 
another criticism of the Johnson test.  Johnson is needlessly 
verbose and multifaceted.  Its multiple tests and the subsidiary 
questions required to be answered thereunder do not provide the 
required clear statement of what the law is.  For these reasons, 
we decline to adopt the Johnson "undue hardship" test as the law 
of this Circuit. 
B. 
 Of the three tests that we have considered, Brunner is the 
most consistent with the scheme that Congress established in 
1978. The Brunner standard meets the practical needs of the 
debtor by not requiring that he or she live in abject poverty for 
up to seven years before a student loan may be discharged.  On 
the other hand, the Brunner standard safeguards the financial 
integrity of the student loan program by not permitting debtors 
who have obtained the substantial benefits of an education funded 
by taxpayer dollars to dismiss their obligation merely because 
repayment of the borrowed funds would require some major personal 
and financial sacrifices.  
 The Brunner test is the most logical and workable of the 
established tests.  Analysis under Brunner is not hampered either 
by the flawed Johnson "policy test" or the unwarranted deference 
with which the Bryant test reviews the personal spending habits 
of student-loan debtors.  Brunner's concise formulation is both 
easier to follow and to apply than Johnson's.  We therefore hold 
that the Brunner "undue hardship" test must now be applied by 
bankruptcy courts within the Third Circuit.   
19 
      V. 
 Brunner now provides the definitive, exclusive authority 
that bankruptcy courts must utilize to determine whether the 
"undue hardship" exception applies.  Student-loan debtors have 
the burden of establishing each element of the Brunner test.  All 
three elements must be satisfied individually before a discharge 
can be granted.  If one of the requirements of the Brunner test 
is not met, the bankruptcy court's inquiry must end there, with a 
finding of no dischargeability.  See id. at 1135.  Equitable 
concerns or other extraneous factors not contemplated by the 
Brunner framework may not be imported into the court's analysis 
to support a finding of dischargeability.  See Norwest Bank 
Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206, 108 S. Ct. 963, 969 
(1988) ("whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy 
courts can only be exercised within the confines of the 
Bankruptcy Code").       
 Applying the factual findings of the bankruptcy court below, 
we now must determine whether Faish has satisfied her burden of 
establishing that repayment of her student-loan obligation would 
impose an "undue hardship" upon her.4  Applying the first prong 
of the Brunner test, we must determine whether Faish "cannot 
maintain, based on current income and expenses, a `minimal' 
standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to 
repay the loans."  Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.   
                                                           
4
  We conclude that sufficient facts appear in the record to 
enable us to perform the Brunner analysis.  Remand, therefore, is 
unnecessary. 
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 The bankruptcy court found that Faish was employed by the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Public Welfare, 
Bureau of Financial Operations, as a budget analyst at the time 
of trial. She earned a gross yearly salary of $27,000.00 in 1993.  
The court found that "Faish's current employment and income were 
good,"   and that while "a payment to PHEAA of nearly $300.00 
[per month] impacts significantly upon Faish's disposable income, 
it does not place her or her son below the subsistence level."  
Faish, No. 93-01686, slip op. at 5. 
 The first prong of the Brunner analysis requires more than a 
showing of tight finances.  Faish has failed to establish through 
evidence presented at trial that, based upon her current income 
and expenses, she could not maintain a minimal standard of living 
if forced to repay her loans.  Therefore, we conclude that Faish 
has failed to satisfy the first element of the Brunner test. 
Accordingly, we need not decide whether she would have satisfied 
the second and third elements of our new standard.  We therefore 
hold that Faish's entire student-loan obligation is 
nondischargeable. 
 Although Faish has a steady job, she argues that her 
inability to find a job in her chosen field militates in favor of 
discharge. In response to a similar claim, the Southern District 
of New York in Brunner denied a discharge in bankruptcy to a 
student-loan debtor who was far less fortunate than Faish.  The 
student-loan debtor in Brunner entered college in 1972.  She 
received a "Bachelor's degree in Psychology in 1979 and a 
Master's degree in social work in 1982."  Brunner, 46 B.R. at 
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756.  Appellee Marie Brunner "testified that she had sent out 
`over a hundred' resumes in search of employment in her chosen 
field."  Id. at 757. Nonetheless, upon graduation Brunner was 
unable to find work and at the time of her hearing she had been 
supporting herself on public assistance for a period of four 
months.  Id.  In the decade prior to her bankruptcy hearing, 
Brunner's "greatest annual income was $9,000."  Id. at 756. 
 Despite Brunner's inability to find work, the district court 
held that she had failed to satisfy the first prong of the 
Brunner test, which the court itself had just articulated.  The 
district court observed that Brunner 
appears to be a woman who is unlikely to find a job in her 
chosen field of work in the near future.  However, she is an 
apparently healthy, presumably intelligent, and well-
educated woman.  Although she claimed to be unable to find 
any other type of work, the evidence presented at the 
hearing is too thin to support a finding that her chances of 
finding any work at all are slim . . . . She has no 
dependents or any other extraordinary burdens which would 
impair her finding other work, or, once it is found, make it 
unlikely that she can both support herself and pay off her 
student loans. 
 
 In short, appellee at most proved that she is 
currently--or was at the time of the hearing--unable both to 
meet her minimal expenses and pay off her loans.  This alone 
cannot support a finding that the failure to discharge her 
loans will impose undue hardship.  (citations omitted).  
Nothing in the record supports a finding that it is likely 
that her current inability to find any work will extend for 
a significant part of the repayment period of the loan or 
that she has "a total incapacity now and in the future to 
pay [her] debts for reasons not within [her] control."  
(quoting In re Rappaport, 16 B.R. 615, 617 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
1981)). 
 
Id. at 757-58.   
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 Today we adopt the reasoning of the Second Circuit.  A 
comparison of the facts in Brunner and Faish is telling.  The 
financial straits of the bankruptcy petitioner in Brunner appear 
to have been far more serious than any short-term, belt-
tightening that may be required of Faish in order to repay her 
student-loan obligation. 
 Faish does not satisfy the standard that we set forth today. 
Moreover, full nondischargeability is especially appropriate here 
because, in essence, Faish was asking the bankruptcy court to 
allow a discharge of her student-loan obligation so that she 
could devote the money (which could otherwise have been earmarked 
for student loan payments) to savings for the purchase of a new 
car and to settle into a new apartment.  Cf. Matthews v. Pineo, 
19 F.3d 121, 124 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 82 (1994) 
(NHSC scholarship recipient's "current income and . . . expenses 
should [not] be regarded as unalterable.  Instead, the proper 
inquiry is whether it would be `unconscionable' to require [the 
debtor] to take any available steps to earn more income or to 
reduce her expenses."). 
  VI.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we adopt the Brunner "undue 
hardship" standard to determine whether student-loan debt can be 
discharged pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B).  We further hold 
that Faish has failed to satisfy her burden to establish undue 
hardship under the Brunner standard and that her entire student-
loan obligation is nondischargeable.  The judgment of the 
district court will be affirmed. 
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